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Abstract 
The study focuses on the absorption and spending capacity of aid inside the member countries of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The absorption and spending of aid are analyzed through the 
impact of aid on, respectively, the non-aid current account balance, and the non-aid government budget. One of 
the new features of the study is the inclusion of financial and government related variables in the list of control 
variables. This helps to capture well the estimators, and avoid the bias generated by the exclusion of relevant 
variables. In addition, the study focuses on more appropriate econometric tools. The analysis focuses on three 
econometric estimators, namely, a fixed effect model, an instrumental variable and the generalized method of 
moments. Results show that aid is more absorbed than spent inside the whole union. Countries that have less 
dependency on aid have better spending capacity than the ones who highly rely on aid. In highly-aid dependent 
countries, aid is used to reduce budget deficit rather than to finance government expenditures.  
Keywords: Aid absorption, Aid spending, Fixed effect, Instrumental variable, Generalized Method of Moments.  
 
1. Introduction 
Over the period 2004-2008, the amount of aid to Africa has quadrupled, surging from around 11billion USD to 
44 billion USD (UN statistics 2008). Targeted toward the reduction of poverty, as well as the leverage of the 
continent’s growth, the purpose of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) was to help Africa accelerate its 
development.  The results remain unsatisfactory. For example, Easterly (2007) states that  “$568 billion in 
today’s dollars flowed into Africa over the past 42 years, yet per capita growth of the median African nation has 
been close to zero.” While some countries have been left heavily indebted and have to follow new conditions and 
processes to change their status, others are still struggling to solve the internal disruptions attributed to the surge 
of aid. However, some countries have been showing positive performances in the use of aid. It is the case of 
Ghana, Zambia, and Senegal. Through meetings and forums (such as Rome, Paris, Accra and Busan), the 
directives, structures and level of commitment of aid have been changing, and new donors have been emerging 
(China, Brazil, Russia among others). However, poverty continues to increase in many parts of the continent, 
which brings more concerns about aid’s efficiency. 
Development assistance was born after the ruins of World War II (Fan and Yuehua, 2008). The 
“Marshal Plan” aid program was targeted to reconstruct Europe by focusing on the alleviation of poverty in less 
advanced countries and the promotion of development (Führer, 1996). As conflicts, starvation and poverty in 
many regions in the world, especially in Africa, were increasing; the generalization of aid among developed 
countries and the involvement of bilateral agencies took place.  With the spread of poverty, the international 
community agreed to more commitments and the gradual increase of aid, following meetings and forums, such 
as the Monterey Consensus in 2002. The most comprehensive attempt to improve the cooperation between 
donors and developing countries is the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005.  
The amount of aid received is not a problem by nature, but rather the policy and conditionality tied to it 
(Collier, 1997). Apart from the donors’ interest, the lack of knowledge of the country realities, culture, people’s 
thoughts and behavior may result in failure or inefficiency. In many cases, the international community sets 
development programs, without any consultancy, and implication of recipient countries. Therefore aid appears as 
a stranger, and taken for granted by developing countries. The resulting effect is the inefficiency in the expected 
outcomes. It is the case of the Structural Adjustment Programs, which has deteriorated the economic conditions 
of many African countries. Nowadays, most of comprehensive programs are set with a full or partial implication 
and commitment of recipient countries. For example, in the Local Agenda, within the framework of the Strategy 
of the Accelerated Growth for Sustainable Development, Recipient nations, local communities and NGOs 
formulate their conception of development, and how they could make efficient use of aid to improve people’s 
lives (IMF, 2012).  
Recipients have the most important responsibility in the failure of aid. Burnside and Dollar (1997, 
2000) find that aid is effective under “good policy”. A country with good institutions, policy and management 
system tend to make efficient use of aid, compared to nations with poor policy. With poor governance, the risk 
of expropriation and corruption financing become high. In many African countries, aid has financed government 
palaces, cars, holidays and public officers’ travels.  In addition, the lack of transparency increases the risk of aid 
fungibility. Fungibility is when aid is used for purposes other than what it is assigned.  Donors as well as 
recipient nations in many cases do not have the same targets and priorities. While donors expect aid to achieve 
some particular goals, recipient governments prioritize nation needs such as wages, taxes, healthcare, and 
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electoral promises. In many cases, governments use aid for their own interest (travel, holidays, purchases etc.). 
The risk of fungibility increases when approaching electoral campaigns.  
The weak cooperation between government and the central bank can lead to inefficiency of aid 
(Martins, 2010). When the government spends the flow of aid for policy purposes, the resulting inflation can be 
controlled by the central bank’s actions on the reserves of aid-related currency. In the case of inaction of the 
central bank, the resulting consequence can be painful for the economy, as the risk of inflation and private 
investment crowding-out effect can increase. On the other side, if aid is fully absorbed by the central bank’s 
actions on international reserves, but not spent by government, the resulting sterilization effect on the economy 
can be effective if the economy is lacking stabilization. However, as the domestic sector has to finance public 
spending, the long-term growth can be difficult to reach in countries where domestic financial capacity remains 
poor. 
This study is concerned with the absorption and spending capacity of aid in the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS), composed of 15 countries, namely, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and 
Togo. By focusing on an economic union characterized by common policy directives (which is the case of the 
ECOWAS), the study brings new insights. In effect the study shows how results can match or oppose studies that 
have focused on all developing countries (such as Morrissey et al., 2005), or African States (for instance, Martin, 
2010). Besides, the collection of recent data brings more accuracy in the analysis compared with previous 
studies. 
The study is structured as follows: chapter section 2 reviews the literature on aid. section 3 presents data 
as well as the methodologies followed in each approach. Following data and methodology, section 4 provides 
results and discussions. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
Concerns about the attainment of the Millennium Goals for Development oriented the debates on aid 
effectiveness to the concepts of capacity of 'absorption' and ‘spending’, suggested by While Berg et al. (2007). 
They defined absorption as the widening of the current account deficit and spending as the widening of the 
government fiscal deficit. While spending depends on fiscal authorities’ capacities to transfer resources to the 
real size of the economy through consumption and investment, absorption is regulated by the central bank, and 
depends on the central bank maintaining the amount of external reserve at a certain level. Therefore, the absence 
of coordination between fiscal authorities and the central bank can be harmful for the macroeconomic stability 
(Aiyar and Ruthbah, 2008). For instance, in the presence of high spending, but low absorption capacity by the 
central bank, the level of government expenditure can have negative effects on the economy.  Although public 
spending can justify the need to boost economic growth, the increment in interest rate that always follows high 
expenditure can crowd-out private investment and reduce long-term growth. In addition, the rise of price 
(inflation) can affect household consumption level as well as real wage. Therefore, the central bank can 
intervene to regulate the level of interest rate, and inhibit the aftermaths of high spending, by selling the aid-
related foreign reserve. In line with the coordination between fiscal authorities and the central bank, Aiyar and 
Ruthbah (2008) distinguish four possible configurations that absorption and spending of aid can take.  
The first configuration is the case where aid is fully absorbed and spent. This case is considered as an 
ideal situation. In fact, when aid is fully spent, government makes use of more financial resources to boost the 
economy. Through the increment in expenditure (or reduction in taxes), the improvement in households’ 
disposable income, as well as the development of the business sector, more resources for the economy are 
generated. The negative effects of government expenditures, such as crowding-out effect, are cancelled out by 
the central bank’s actions on international reserves (absorption). In addition, the supply of foreign currency to 
the economy releases more resources to finance imports. 
For the second configuration, a full spending of aid can be associated with no absorption. In this regard, 
Hussain et al. (2009) argue that a full absorption associated with no spending of aid is similar to the case of 
budgetary policy when there is no flow of aid. While central bank builds the reserve of foreign currency, 
government finances its deficit using the traditional tools, such as note printing or open market. The increase in 
interest rate that follows the two policy tools (monetary creation, open market) can be harmful for the economy; 
the more so as private investment becomes crowded-out. 
The third configuration is a full absorption associated with no spending:  This configuration between 
absorption and spending of aid can justify a need for stabilization in countries facing high deficits, such as 
budgetary deficit, high debt level.   The central bank releases all aid related reserves, while government does not 
spend the additional money inflow. Aid can therefore be used as a substitute for monetary creation (for financing 
government deficits), or for debt alleviation. On the other side, as foreign reserves increase, the additional 
domestic demand leads to the increment in net imports, which can create pressures on real exchange. 
In the fourth configuration, there is no absorption and no spending of aid: This is a case of static 
behavior of both government   and the central bank. Government does not spend the inflow of aid (which can be 
justified by some sterilization targets, or a need for stabilization), while the central bank increases the reserve of 
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international currencies. This configuration is not desirable as slow in government and central bank’s actions 
delays the long-term growth of the economy. 
Recent studies have proposed different approaches of absorption and spending. For example Henrik and 
Derek (2010) define aid absorption as the impact of aid on net import, and spending the impact of aid on 
domestic demand. In effect, a high level of import can be explained as the country’s capacity to transfer foreign 
aid to the real economy.  Absorption comes from the fact that the inflow of foreign reserve (related to the 
increment in aid) is transferred to the rest of the world through international purchases (import). As for spending, 
their definition includes a broader aspect. While Berg et al. (2007) and Aiyar and Ruthbah (2008) are limited to 
government deficit, Henrik and Derek (2010) include private consumption and investment.  In their study, 
Henrik and Derek (2010) investigate their concept of absorption and spending using a VAR model as well as the 
Monte Carlo simulation in small developing countries categorized into two groups: aid-dependents and non-aid 
dependents. Their results suggest a negligible absorption and spending capacity in non-aid dependents countries. 
However, in aid-dependents countries, there is similarity between absorption and spending. 
Apart from the two concepts of absorption and spending of aid, many studies have attempted to propose 
strategies to improve the effectiveness of aid. One of the major contemporary contributions started from 
Burnside and Dollar (2000).  In their study on the impact of foreign aid on per capita GDP, they find that aid has 
a significant impact on income, under better monetary, fiscal and trade policy. These findings agree with those of 
Collier and Dollar (2002), as well as Radelet Clemens, and Bhavnani (2004), who emphasize the importance of 
the macroeconomic environment when examining aid effectiveness. However Rajan and Subramanian (2007) 
oppose any term under which assistance could be effectual. According to them, aid has always been inefficient in 
increasing income. Thus, an increment in aid is not desirable. These critiques were previously found in Rajan 
and Subramanian (2005). They denounced the harmful consequences of aid flows for growing industries in 
developing countries. Nonetheless, Malick (2008) opposed this argument and showed that aid flow has 
negligible negative impact on weak industries. 
The overall literature shows a mitigated consensus about the macroeconomic effect of aid. If formers 
studies lacked more robust tools, and strong empirical evidences to address the effectiveness of aid, the recent 
development in the field of econometrics contributed to spread the debate among economists. One of the major 
findings that play crucial roles in the directives of policy makers are, the low spending capacity of aid in 
developing countries and the distinction between grant and loan when analyzing the efficiency of aid. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
This study gathers data from different sources including the International Monetary Fund Balance of Payment 
Statistics (BOPS), the Africa Development Indicators (available in the World Bank Database), and the World 
Economic Outlook (WEO). For the democracy variable, the analysis uses the Unified Democracy Score 
developed by Pemstein et al. (2010) and released in 2014. Pemstein et al. (2010) construct the Unified 
democracy index by compiling varied governance indicators from different sources including Freedom House 
and Polity IV.  Table 1 summarizes the list of variables used in the study.  The study covers the period 1980-
2011 (32 years) and is applied to the 15 countries composing the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS).  
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Table 1. Description and sources of variables 
Data Description Source 
Per Capita GDP (in logarithm) Gross domestic product per inhabitant  Africa Development 
Indicators 
Democracy score Improvement in democracy (standard 
deviation) 
The Quality of 
Governance (QOG) 
Standard Dataset  
Terms of Trade (in logarithm) Ratio export/Import Africa Development 
Indicators 
International Reserve (/ GDP) The stock of international currency help 
by the Central Bank  
World Economic Outlook 
Gross fixed capital formation (/GDP) Change in government physical assets. 
Also called public investment  
Africa Development 
Indicators 
Inflation 
(Percentage change) 
Variation in domestic price (Consumer 
Price Index) 
Africa Development 
Indicators 
Government spending (/ GDP) Government consumption expenditure 
on goods and services. 
Africa Development 
Indicators 
Domestic financing (/ GDP) Domestic credit provided by financial 
sector 
Africa Development 
Indicators, World 
Economic Outlook 
Debt service ratio Ratio total debt / export Africa Development 
Indicators 
Non-aid government budget (/GDP) Difference between government tax and 
expenditure (net of aid) 
Africa Development 
Indicators 
Non-aid current account balance (/GDP) Sum of net exports of goods and 
services, net primary income, and net 
secondary income (aid deducted) 
Africa Development 
Indicators, IMF BOPS 
Aid grant (/GDP) Non repayable funds from multilateral, 
bilateral partnership, NGO etc. 
Africa Development 
Indicators, IMF BOPS 
 
Tables 2 presents a summary statistics of the main variables. Results show a deficit of both non-aid current 
balance and government budget.  The deficit of the non-aid current account balance appears higher than that of 
the government budget (-0.13 against -0.1) indicating the important depletion of financial resources in absence of 
aid.  
The large gap between the minimum value and the maximum value of the non-aid current account balance (-2.06 
and 0.17) as well as the high standard deviation (0.20) show the high disparity between countries in terms of 
deficit. In the whole union, the amount of aid received during the study period represents 7% of GDP.  
 
Table 2. Summary statistics of the main variables: ECOWAS countries 
 
ECOWAS 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Aid (/GDP) 383 0.07 0.18 0.00 1.88 
Non-aid current account balance (/GDP)                 375 
 
-0.13 0.20 -2.06 0.17 
Non-aid government budget (/GDP) 368 -0.10 0.11 -0.61 0.10 
International reserve (/GDP) 451 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.74 
Log GDP per capita 470 6.97 0.47 4.61 8.19 
 
Table 3 establishes a comparative statistics between highly aid dependent and the relatively less dependent 
countries. Although highly aid dependent countries use more aid than others (10.16% against 3% for less 
dependent), their macroeconomic indicators remain unsatisfactory.  In effect, they have the lowest per capita 
GDP (the log of per capita GDP is 6.85 for highly dependent countries against 7.15 for less dependent countries), 
and the highest deficit of both non-aid current account balance (-0.17 against  -0.08 for less dependent) and non-
aid government budget (-0.1 against -0.09). The reserves of international currency constitute around 11% of 
GDP in the union, with a higher ratio in highly dependent countries (11%) compared with less dependent 
countries (10%). 
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Table 3.  Summary statistics: highly aid dependent (1) countries vs. less dependent (2) countries 
 
Less dependent Highly dependent 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
           Aid (/GDP) 156 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.10 227 0.10 0.22 0.00 1.88 
 
Non-aid current account 
balance (/GDP) 156 -0.08 0.07 -0.19 0.17 219 -0.17 0.25 -2.06 0.09 
 
Non-aid government 
 balance (/GDP) 158 -0.09 0.13 -0.59 0.10 210 -0.10 0.09 -0.61 0.03 
 
International  
reserve (/GDP) 172 0.10 0.08 0.00 0.39 279 0.11 0.10 0.00 0.74 
 
Log GDP per capita 186 7.15 0.30 6.60 7.87 284 6.85 0.52 4.61 8.19 
(1) :  Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, Senegal, Guinea 
(2) :  Cape Verde, Gambia, Liberia, Niger, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, Benin 
 
The study uses the approach of Aiyar and Ruthbah (2008). Instead of looking at a worldwide picture of the 
absorption and spending capacity of aid, which can lack strong interpretations, this study focuses on a single 
economic union, namely the ECOWAS. By considering an economic union, the study shows how results and 
interpretations can be more pertinent when the union is composed of similar countries, with common general 
policy directives, which is the case of the ECOWAS. In addition, as the macroeconomic management of aid 
involves government, as well as the domestic sphere, limiting the control variables to few indicators, weakens 
the analysis, as the exclusion of relevant variables generates biases in the estimates.  Therefore, this research 
introduces more control variables involved in both the management of aid and the financial sphere of the 
economy.   
 The following equation defines the specification for this research: 𝑁𝐴𝐶𝐴𝐵!" = 𝛼!! + 𝜌!𝑁𝐴𝐶𝐴𝐵!"!! + 𝛽!𝐴𝐼𝐷!" + 𝜎!!!!!! 𝑋!"# + 𝜀!!"             (8) 𝑁𝐴𝐺𝐵!" = 𝛼!! + 𝜌!𝑁𝐴𝐺𝐵!"!! + 𝛽!𝐴𝐼𝐷!" + 𝜎!!!!!! 𝑋!"# + 𝜀!!"                  (9) 
            NACAB is the non-aid current account balance (divided by GDP); NAGB the non-aid government 
Budget (divided by GDP); AID, development grant (as divided by GDP); α!" and 𝛼!! are two constant terms 
reflecting the country i specific effect;  𝜀!!" and 𝜀!!"  are error terms;  𝜎!! and 𝜎!!are two impact parameters related 
to the control variables; The subscript i represents the country index, and t the time;  𝑋!"# is a control vector of 
factors that can affect NACAB or NAGB. 𝑋!"#    includes aid-grant, GDP per capita, democracy score, index of 
terms of trade, International reserves, gross fixed capital formation, inflation, government spending, domestic 
financing, and debt service ratio, as listed in table 1. 
Three estimators are used in the analysis. The first estimator is the fixed effect OLS. This estimator is 
used to capture the impact of the dependent variables on the control variables overtime and across countries. The 
fixed effect model assumes that each country’s characteristics affect the expected outcomes, and therefore need 
to be controlled. The second estimator is the Instrumental Variable (IV). IV is used to account for the possible 
endogeneity of the variable aid, and the spurious estimate that follows. The list of estimators found in the 
literature includes: lagged aid, lagged population (Burnside and Dollar, 2000), lagged inflation, land (Dalgaard et 
al., 2004), and infant mortality (Knack, 2000). Finally, the third estimator is the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM). GMM provides more robust results due to the strength of the estimator (consistent, and 
convergent), and its capacity to minimize biases, as compared to the Ordinary Least Squared, the Generalized 
Least Squared, and the Instrumental Variable (IV) etc. 
Considering the fact that some countries are more highly aid dependent than others, the analysis 
provides 3 results: for the overall union, for highly aid dependent and for less dependent countries. To do this, 
first, the World Bank’s ranking on aid dependency is used to select and classify countries with respect to their 
rank. Of 4 indicators (Aid as % of GNI, Aid as % of gross capital formation, Aid as % of central government 
expenditure and Aid as % of imports of goods and services) a preference is given to Aid as % of imports of 
goods and services, as it provides the longest time span data. Second, the top 9 countries, with a ratio above 30% 
are separated from the remaining countries. And finally, a comparative analysis between highly aid dependent 
and relatively less dependent countries is applied, using the three estimators (Fixed Effect, IV and GMM).  
 
4. Results and discussion 
Tables 4 and 5 report the absorption and spending capacity of aid in the whole union. As suggested by the result, 
 6 
the three estimators show a higher absorption of aid, outreaching 0.8. In other words, a USD 1 increment in aid 
broadens the non-aid current account deficit by more than 0.8.  The IV indicates a full absorption of aid (-1.08). 
On the contrary, the impact of aid on non-aid government budget (spending) is mixed. While the fixed effect 
indicates that around 20% of aid is spent, the IV estimation shows aid is rather used to reduce the deficit of 
government budget. However, the GMM estimator indicates non-significance of the coefficient.  
 This finding suggests that more aid related currencies are exchanged by the central bank than they are 
transferred to the real economy. Therefore, to finance its deficit, government can decide to either print notes, 
which could be harmful for the economy, as price of goods can increase, or to borrow from the private sector 
(domestic financing). In less-advanced countries such as ECOWAS, the fragility of the private sector as well as 
the financial system hinders the domestic financing capacity.  
 Government spending as well as public investment (gross fixed capital formation) has higher impact on 
the non-aid government budget than on the non-aid current account balance. A USD 1 increase in the 
government spending enlarges government budget by around USD 0.36 (table 5) and the current account deficit 
by USD 0.21 (table 4). In addition, a USD 1 increase in public investment broadens government budget by more 
than 0.32 on average (table 5), and increases the non-aid current account deficit by 0.17 on average (considering 
the fixed effect and GMM estimates in table 4). The relative higher impact of government spending and public 
investment on non-aid government budget is explained by the fact that these variables (government spending and 
public investment) are related to government actions on national budget, and therefore are likely to have more 
impact on non-aid government budget than non-aid current account balance. In contrasts, non-aid current 
account balance is closer to the central bank’s interventions.  
 However, the impact of government spending and public investment appear lower than expected. Three 
reasons explain these results. First, the limited financial resources in the union reduces governments’ flexibility 
on managing the national budget.  An important contribution to the budget comes from external resources (loan, 
aid); the second reason is the problem of aid fungibility that affects the efficiency of aid. Fungibility is when aid 
is used for purposes different from the objectives for which it has been assigned. In many countries, aid has been 
used to finance government priorities (travels, palaces, electoral campaigns etc.); third, the issues of absorption, 
spending, and fungibility have developed a new way of support to poor countries. Many development partners 
invest directly to the partner country, with no involvement of government’s actions.  These types of support are 
not recorded in the balance of payment sheets. 
Table 4. The impact of aid on non-aid current account balance (absorption) 
                     Non-aid government budget 
 
FIXED EFFECT IV GMM 
VARIABLES 
        
L.(Non-aid government budget) 
  
0.4406*** 
   
(0.0858) 
Aid (%GDP) -0.2043* 0.1406*** -0.0807 
 
(0.1188) (0.0373) (0.1025) 
GDP per capita 0.0711* 0.0932*** 0.1049*** 
 
(0.0411) (0.0177) (0.0349) 
Democracy score (sd) -0.0113 -0.2027 -0.0749 
 
(0.1746) (0.2236) (0.1242) 
Index of terms of trade  -0.0040 -0.1147*** -0.0034 
 
(0.0387) (0.0424) (0.0368) 
International reserves (/GDP) 0.2973*** 0.2174** 0.1046 
 
(0.0717) (0.0861) (0.0749) 
Gross fixed capital formation (/GDP) -0.2925*** -0.3782*** -0.3166*** 
 
(0.0986) (0.0861) (0.0923) 
Inflation -0.0703 -0.3570*** -0.0674 
 
(0.0430) (0.0392) (0.0473) 
Government spending (/GDP) -0.2397 0.3581** -0.2593 
 
(0.1625) (0.1391) (0.1890) 
Domestic financing (/GDP) -0.3677*** -0.1172 -0.2843** 
 
(0.1270) (0.1666) (0.1447) 
Debt service ratio (total debt/export) -0.0434 0.0181 -0.0221 
 
(0.0332) (0.0403) (0.0153) 
Constant -0.5018* -0.4588*** -0.6654*** 
 
(0.2754) (0.1349) (0.2536) 
Observations 264 254 231 
R-squared 0.2182 0.4192  
Number of id 15 15 15 
Instruments 264 254 232 
AR(1) . . 0.1464 
AR(2) . . 0.4487 
Hansen test of overid. . . 1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5. The impact of aid on non-aid government budget (spending) 
 
                 Non-aid current account balance 
 
FIXED EFFECT IV GMM 
Variables 
        
L. (Non-aid government budget) 
  
0.0041 
   
(0.2560) 
Aid (%GDP) -0.8224*** -1.0826*** -0.8283*** 
 
(0.0743) (0.0188) (0.0623) 
GDP per capita -0.1209*** -0.0060 -0.1149*** 
 
(0.0251) (0.0087) (0.0438) 
Democracy score (sd) 0.0467 0.1406 0.1028 
 
(0.1083) (0.1113) (0.1465) 
Index of terms of trade  0.0410* 0.0556*** 0.0339* 
 
(0.0240) (0.0211) (0.0193) 
International reserves (%GDP) 0.1029** 0.0359 0.0883 
 
(0.0444) (0.0430) (0.0723) 
Gross fixed capital formation (%GDP) -0.1972*** -0.1474*** -0.1977 
 
(0.0606) (0.0431) (0.1208) 
Inflation -0.0424 -0.0089 -0.0481 
 
(0.0270) (0.0197) (0.0338) 
Government spending (%GDP) -0.0703 -0.2072*** -0.0032 
 
(0.1018) (0.0699) (0.2099) 
Domestic financing (%GDP) -0.0739 -0.0769 -0.0590 
 
(0.0791) (0.0833) (0.0694) 
Debt service ratio ( total debt/export) -0.0611*** -0.0500** -0.0736 
 
(0.0204) (0.0200) (0.0608) 
Constant 0.7308*** -0.0931 0.6875*** 
 
(0.1671) (0.0647) (0.2593) 
   Observations 269 259 239 
R-squared 0.4147 0.9567 
 Number of id 15 15 15 
Instruments . . 232 
AR(1) . . 0.017 
AR(2) . . 0.295 
Hansen test of overid. . . 1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
   The difference between countries in terms of aid dependency prompts analyzing and comparing their 
performances regarding the use of aid.  Tables 6 and 7 compare aid absorption and spending between highly aid 
dependent countries and less dependent countries. The analysis shows a higher absorption capacity of in highly 
aid dependent countries, outpacing USD 0.8 per USD inflow of aid as compared with less dependent countries 
(table 6). In less dependent countries, on average, around 50% of aid is absorbed by the central bank, lower than 
the whole union average (80%). However, the spending capacity appears better in less dependent countries, who 
have improved economic indicators, as well as good policy systems compared with highly dependent countries. 
As suggested by the result (table 7), although only the fixed effect shows a significant estimate for less 
dependent countries, the coefficient suggests that there is a full spending capacity in less dependent countries (-
1.66). On the contrary, in highly dependent countries, aid is used to reduce government deficit rather than spent. 
Results show that a USD 1 increase in aid inflow reduces government deficit by around USD 0.08.  
Moreover, the analysis indicates that government spending has higher impact in broadening budget 
deficit in less dependent countries (a USD1 increase in government spending increases the non-aid government 
budget by around USD 0.4), than highly aid dependent countries (USD 0.2), and the whole union (0.36).  This 
finding shows that in less dependent countries, around 60% of government spending comes from external 
resources, against 80% in highly dependent countries. International reserve appears more effective in reducing 
non-aid current account balance in less dependent countries. A USD 1 increment in international reserves 
reduces the non-aid current account balance by USD 0.17. On the contrary, in highly aid dependent countries, 
the impact is more significant for the non-aid government budget. Around 40% of government deficit is reduced 
due to the central bank actions on aid-related reserves. This mitigated result shows that in less dependent 
countries, the central bank is more active in the use of aid, compared to highly dependent countries where 
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government has more control on aid (in many cases, for bureaucracy, and purposes rather than the objective for 
which aid has been provided). 
A change in democracy score has different impacts on non-aid current account balance for both highly aid 
dependent countries and less dependent countries. Table 6 shows that improvement in democracy contributes to 
the enlargement of non-aid current account balance in less dependent countries, and reduces the non-aid current 
account balance in highly dependent countries. In both cases, the average absolute value of the impact is 0.3 for 
a 1 point change in the democracy score. This result is particularly important in the sense that it shows when 
democracy improves less dependent countries rely on borrowing more from the rest of the world. In effect, the 
non-aid current account balance can be interpreted as the difference between savings and investment (Olivei, 
2010). On the contrary, highly dependent countries, through the stabilization of their financial system (due to the 
improvement in democracy), tend to borrow less from the rest of the world. 
 
Table 6.  AID ABSORPTION: Highly Aid dependents vs. less dependents countries 
  Less dependents countries Highly dependents countries 
 
FIXED EFFECT       IV GMM FIXED EFFECT     IV GMM 
VARIABLES Non-aid current account balance Non-aid current account balance 
L.Non-aid current account Balance 
  
0.5508*** 
  
-0.1768 
   
(-0.0859) 
  
(-0.281) 
Aid (/GDP) -0.3767 -0.7828** -0.3640* -0.8270*** -1.0870*** -0.8239*** 
 
(-0.2770) (-0.3181) (-0.2099) (-0.0856) (-0.0237) (-0.0532) 
GDP per capita -0.0805 0.0519** 0.0271 -0.1361*** -0.0131 -0.1372*** 
 
(-0.0518) (-0.0225) (-0.0166) (-0.0311) (-0.0176) (-0.0432) 
Democracy score (sd) -0.3156** -0.2504* -0.0837 0.3846** 0.3862* 0.4637** 
 
(-0.1294) (-0.1301) (-0.1085) (-0.1713) (-0.2031) (-0.2334) 
Index of terms of trade  0.0229 0.0489* 0.0058 0.0221 0.0091 0.0394 
 
(-0.0283) (-0.0251) (-0.0197) (-0.059) (-0.0516) (-0.1236) 
International reserves (/GDP) 0.1782*** 0.1705*** 0.0353 0.0235 -0.043 0.0539 
 
(-0.0593) (-0.056) (-0.048) (-0.0637) (-0.0716) (-0.0594) 
Gross fixed capital formation (/GDP) -0.2164** -0.3444*** -0.1370** -0.2150*** -0.1009 -0.1656 
 
(-0.1018) (-0.0655) (-0.0624) (-0.079) (-0.0635) (-0.1438) 
Inflation 0.0015 0.0732** 0.0417 -0.0461 -0.017 -0.0650* 
 
(-0.0417) (-0.0362) (-0.029) (-0.0369) (-0.0267) (-0.0381) 
Government spending (/GDP) -0.4274*** -0.4633*** -0.1399 0.1346 -0.2023* 0.2082 
 
(-0.155) (-0.1287) (-0.1079) (-0.1447) (-0.109) (-0.1975) 
Domestic financing (/GDP) -0.0517 -0.008 -0.0224 -0.175 -0.1624 -0.2161 
 
(-0.0785) (-0.081) (-0.0633) (-0.2028) (-0.2263) (-0.1872) 
Debt service ratio (debt / export) -0.0194 -0.0465 -0.0241 -0.0687*** -0.0475* -0.119 
 
(-0.0366) (-0.0305) (-0.0248) (-0.0259) (-0.0267) (-0.0869) 
Constant 0.5892* -0.3865*** -0.1786* 0.7707*** 0.0046 0.6849** 
 
(-0.3483) (-0.1323) (-0.1044) (-0.217) (-0.1594) (-0.3443) 
Observations 118 113 113 151 146 133 
R-squared 0.4454 0.5717  0.4837 0.9685  
Number of id 6 6 6 9 9 9 
Instruments 
  
107   134 
AR(1) . . 0.0739 . . 0.0179 
AR(2)   0.9285   0.149 
Hansen test of overid. . . 1 . . 1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7.  AID SPENDING: Highly aid dependent vs. Less dependents countries 
  Less dependents countries Highly dependent countries 
 
FIXED EFFECT           IV                         GMM 
Non-aid government budget 
       FIXEDEFFECT                 IV                   GMM 
Non-aid government budget 
VARIABLES   
L.(Non-aid government budget) 
  
0.7941*** 
  
0.3739*** 
   
(-0.0705) 
  
(-0.1307) 
Aid (/GDP) -1.6578*** 1.8370 0.4809 -0.1062 0.0827*** -0.0249 
 
(-0.5931) (1.1666) (-0.5399) (-0.1058) (-0.0281) (-0.0879) 
GDP per capita 0.2749** 0.3176*** 0.0805* 0.0094 0.0212 0.0675** 
 
(-0.1207) (0.0849) (-0.0462) (-0.0385) (-0.0209) (-0.0296) 
Democracy score (sd) -0.0348 -0.3624 -0.084 0.1308 -0.2417 -0.0677 
 
(-0.2781) (0.5327) (-0.2726) (-0.2118) (-0.2409) (-0.1532) 
Index of terms of trade  0.1203** -0.3172*** -0.0596 -0.0546 -0.1244** -0.0138 
 
(-0.0603) (0.0894) (-0.0535) (-0.0729) (-0.0612) (-0.0806) 
International reserves (/GDP) 0.0559 0.1404 0.0313 0.5346*** 0.3743*** 0.2394** 
 
(-0.1275) (0.1668) (-0.1107) (-0.0787) (-0.0849) (-0.0955) 
Gross fixed capital formation (/GDP) -0.5166** -0.3376 -0.0455 -0.2138** -0.2576*** -0.3034*** 
 
(-0.2277) (0.2236) (-0.1419) (-0.0977) (-0.0753) (-0.1088) 
Inflation 0.0331 -0.3476*** -0.0374 -0.0702 -0.2666*** -0.0930** 
 
(-0.0905) (0.127) (-0.0803) (-0.0446) (-0.0317) (-0.0384) 
Government spending (/GDP) -0.5483 0.1706 -0.1987 0.1849 0.1884 0.082 
 
(-0.3314) (0.3675) (-0.2569) (-0.1788) (-0.1293) (-0.1515) 
Domestic financing (/GDP) -0.2377 -0.2487 -0.1612 -0.2847 -0.0096 -0.13 
 
(-0.1667) (0.2703) (-0.1675) (-0.2507) (-0.2684) (-0.2231) 
Debt service ratio (debt /export) -0.0586 0.0614 -0.004 -0.0424 -0.0203 -0.0288** 
 
(-0.0792) (0.0916) (-0.0656) (-0.032) (-0.0316) (-0.0119) 
Constant -2.0969** -1.6665*** -0.4363 -0.0984 0.0607 -0.4423* 
 
(-0.8272) (0.4245) (-0.2831) (-0.2683) (-0.1891) (-0.2555) 
       Observations 113 108 110 151 146 129 
R-squared 0.2737 0.5144 
 
0.3914 0.529 
 Number of id 6 6 6 9 9 9 
Instruments . . 110 . . 130 
AR(1) . . 0.02 . . 0.205 
AR(2)   0.176   0.6283 
Hansen test of overid. . . 1 . . 1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       
5. Conclusion 
For over 50 years, Africans and specifically ECOWAS countries have been waiting for an economic miracle, in 
spite of the huge amount of aid received every year. Concerns about the effectiveness of aid in improving 
countries’ living standards justify the importance of this research. The study is aimed to analyze the absorption 
and spending capacity of aid inside the union, using appropriate econometric tools. The findings suggest the 
following:  (i) the spending capacity of aid remains unsatisfactory in the whole union; (ii) the absorption capacity 
is found to be higher in highly aid dependent countries, than less aid dependent countries; (iii) spending appears 
to be high in less dependent countries. On the opposite, in highly aid dependent countries a little amount of aid 
(8%) is used to finance government deficit.  
However, this study has some limitations. The first limitation is the exclusion of aid fungibility. The 
study does not investigate how the mismatches between development partners’ expectations and recipient 
countries’ actions affect the macroeconomic indicators.  The second limitation is the approach itself. In effect, it 
would have been more pertinent to investigate the country-specific performance in terms of management aid, in 
order to have deep insight of the issue of aid effectiveness.  
The union has been exploring different mechanisms to improve the effectiveness of aid in eradicating 
poverty, and improving people’s living standards. The numerous forums on aid disbursement, followed by 
structural adjustments and all other reforms are expected to bring a change in the final outcomes. As developing 
countries are on the way to move from the Millennium Goals for Development (MGDs) to the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), the development partners as well as ECOWAS countries, in a coordinated manner 
have to be more responsible in their respective roles. On one hand, an assessment and revision of their roles in 
the development process is necessary. On the other hand, stronger commitment and prudent cooperation is 
required to make their actions more effective. With the SDGs, and all other new concepts, many indicators are 
on the way to being developed. This creates more challenges for the recipient countries, the donors as well as the 
researchers. 
In the context of globalization, and the attainment of SDGs, countries’ economic and political 
conditions have high knock-on effect on other regions. This research is a starting point for deeper investigation 
of the absorption and spending capacity of aid. Further research should not only consider the factors that affect 
the fungibility of aid, but also how the economic conditions and political stability of the regions affect the 
absorption and spending of aid, and how factors such as remittances, and foreign direct investment can influence 
government actions on aid. 
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Appendix:    Theoretical model 
This section explores the theory behind the concept of absorption and spending of aid in the case of a small open 
economy, following the original model developed by Berg et al. (2010).  
Suppose a small economy connected to the rest of the world, and having two types of goods: tradable and non-
tradable, denoted by T and N, respectively.  The economy is composed of four agents: households, firms, central 
bank, and government. Each agent has an important role in the economy, and is guided by a constrained utility or 
profit maximization. Government’s action is guided by the concern to protect the economy from a sudden 
collapse.  
1. Households constraints 
Considering a continuum of households, the consumption function is given by a Constant Elasticity Substitution 
function (CES):  
  
Price of goods is given by the CPI:  
 
Where: Pt
T is the price of tradable goods; and Pt
N  the price of non-tradable goods; x the elasticity of 
substitutions between tradable and non-tradable goods; φ the bias in domestic consumption; j household index. 
From equation (1) the derived demands functions for tradable and non-tradable goods are respectively given by: 
 
 
Households are divided into 2 categories: asset holders and non-asset holders. 
-   Asset holders consume a portion of their income, and save the remaining for future consumption. Their 
objective is to maximize a long-term utility function:  
 
Subject to the budget constraint: 
   
Where: lta the supply of labor;  the inverse of labor supply elasticity; it  nominal interest rate; btac  domestic 
bonds ;  bta* real foreign  asset ;Q(bta*) adjustment cost of assets; St nominal exchange rate, ? ?! domestic 
inflation, wt real wage; ? ?!!" profits received the non tradable sector’s firms ; τ is a lump sum tax  ( real value). 
The resulting optimum solution for an asset holder is given by :  
 
- Non-asset holders maximize the same long-term utility, however, they face a rigid budget constraint:  
  
Where the superscript h denotes the non-asset holder.  
The first order solution is given by:  
 
Aggregating both asset holder and non-asset holder’s solution derives the consumer solution: 
 
 
 
Where  is the fraction of non-asset holders and xt  a function of  ct, ,  c!!,  c!! ,  𝑙!, b!∗,  b!!,  ? ?!!  
!Ctj = ϕ 1x ctjN( )χ−1χ + 1−ϕ( )1x ctjT( )χ−1χ⎡⎣⎢⎢ ⎤⎦⎥⎥
χ−1
χ
!Pt = ϕ PtN( )1−χ + 1−ϕ( ) PtT( )1−χ⎛⎝ ⎞⎠ 11−χ
!ctjT = 1−ϕ( ) StPtTPt⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟
−χ
ct
j
!
ct
jN =ϕ Pt
N( )− χ ctj
!E0 β tt=0∞∑ log cta( )− χ1+ψ lta( )1+ψ⎡⎣⎢ ⎤⎦⎥
!cta +btac + stbta∗ !=wtlta + it−1 bt−1acπt + sti∗bt−1a* !−stQ(bta∗)+Ωt aN −τ
!
χ lt
a( )ψ = wtcta
!ct
h =wtlt
h −τ h
!
χ lt
h( )ψ = wtcth
!xt =℘xta + 1−℘( )xth
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
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2. Firms constraints 
There are two categories of firms: firms from the tradable sector and firms from the non-tradable good sector. 
 
- In the non tradable good sectors, firm’s objective is to maximize a “discounted flow of profit” ( Berg et al. 
2010,  pp. 11): 
 
 
The first order condition provides the solution for at the optimum level. 
 
where:          
 
  reflects the elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods; 
y production ; i the type of good;   the repartition of labor in each sector; zN an index of 
productivity, and  is the amount of subsidy received by firm i. 
- In the tradable good sector, it is assumed a perfect competition. Price automatically adjusts to supply and 
demand. The maximizing function of profit is given by:  
 
And the derived solution:  
 
 
3. Government and spending of aid 
To finance its purchases (spending) government makes use of the following tools:  
Taxes (? ?) , foreign aid ( stAt* ), the central bank’s reserve, domestic bonds in exchange of an interest rate 𝑏!!.  
The budget constraint is given by: 
 
Where gt is tradable or non tradable goods;  ptg the price of good. 
Assuming that the variable aid follows an autoregressive process of order 1: 
 
Where A*t is the initial level of aid. 
Deposit of aid gives a hint on government fiscal policy. The autoregressive process of deposit related to aid is 
therefore given by: 
 
In the equation, spending of aid reflected in . Following an increment in aid, government uses a portion  to 
finance its purchases. 
 
4.  Central bank and absorption of aid 
The monetary policy undertaken by the central bank follows the Taylor (1993) rule:  
 
 
!E0 Jt pitN
pit
N
pt
N
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
−θ
yt
N 1+ι( )−wtN pitNptN⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ −
θ
α yt
N
zN
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
1
α
−Γ Pt
N , ytN ,π itN( )−ιptN ytN⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥t=0
∞
∑
!πt
N πt
N −1( ) = βEt ctact+1a πt+1N πtN −1( )⎡⎣⎢⎢ ⎤⎦⎥⎥+ 1ξ θ1+ι( ) θ −1( ) wtNptN⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ ytN( )
1−α
α
zN( )
1
α
−1⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
!Jt = β ctact+1a
!E0 Jt stzT litT( )α −wtTlitT⎡⎣⎢ ⎤⎦⎥t=0∞∑
!
wt
T
st
T =
yt
T( )
1−α
α
zT( )
1
α
!ptggt = τ − it−1 −1( )bt−1cπt + st At* + bt − bt−1πt⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ − dt − dt−1πt⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟
!At* = A* + ρA At−1* − A*( )+ A*εt
!dt = ρddt−1 + 1− ρd( )d + 1−γ( )st At* − A*( )
!it = 1β πtN( )φπ
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
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Combine with a long-term objective of reserve accumulation  
 
When the amount of aid in the reserve increases at a fraction (1 − ω), central bank draws a portion of the 
increment, at fraction ρR .  The short-term absorption of aid is reflected by ω.  
 
5. Equilibrium and possible use of aid 
By adding all budgets constraints (households, firms, government and central bank,) the balance of payment 
equilibrium provides the three possible use of aid: 
 
 The right hand side of the equation indicates that aid can be used to finance a net aid current account deficit  
(first term), fill in the capital account (second term) or can be saved in the reserve of international currencies.  
 
 
!Rt* = ρRRt−1* + 1− ρR( )R* + 1−ω( ) At* − A*( )
!At* = ctT + gtT − ytT +℘Q bta*( )− it−1* −1( )bt−1*⎡⎣ ⎤⎦+ bt* −bt−1*( )+ Rt* −Rt−1*( )
(18) 
(19) 
